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Abstract 
This article examines the seminal 1992 United States Supreme 
Court decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 1 specifical-
ly focusing on the Lucas nuisance exception. I surveyed approxi-
mately 1,600 reported regulatory takings cases decided since the Lu-
cas decision involving Lucas takings challenges. I identified the 
statutory nuisance cases in which state and local governments unsuc-
cessfully asserted the Lucas nuisance exception as a defense to the 
courts' findings of a Lucas taking. This article examines the prospec-
tive potential of these cases for assisting private property owners in 
enhancing private property rights protections within the area of 
regulatory takings. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I revisit the ad hoc and murky regulatory tak-
ings doctrine, reflecting on the 1992 United States Supreme Court 
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2 The Lucas 
Court articulated a categorical regulatory takings rule and an excep-
tion to that categorical rule. The categorical rule the Court articulated 
is that private property owners are entitled to compensation for a tak-
ing under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when a government 
"regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land."3 The Lucas Court acknowledged that the categorical takings 
rule was subject to what has become well-known as the "nuisance 
exception."4 When a regulation implicates the Lucas categorical tak-
ings rule, the government can avoid the duty to pay compensation if 
it can prove that the "proscribed use interests were not part of [the 
owner's] title to begin with."5 In other words, any limitation that is 
severe enough to deprive a private property owner of all economical-
ly beneficial use of the owner's property "cannot be newly legislated 
or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, 
in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of 
1 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 1015. 
4 Id. at 1022-23 ("It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that 'harm-
ful or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the 
requirement of compensation."). 
5 Id. at 1027. 
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property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."6 
The Lucas decision exists within the context of two signifi-
cant United States Supreme Court cases: the 1987 case of First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, Califor-
nia 7 and the 2002 case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.8 In First English, the United 
States Supreme Court stated that temporary takings that "deny a 
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from per-
manent takings," which clearly must be compensated under the Unit-
ed States Constitution.9 Later, in Tahoe-Sierra, which involved two 
temporary development moratoria, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the Lucas categorical takings test. 10 The Tahoe-Sierra Court 
concluded that the focus should be on the whole parcel, not a tem-
poral slice. 11 Additionally, the Tahoe-Sierra Court held that in cases 
of prospectively temporary takings, the analysis should be under the 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York12 regulatory 
takings balancing test, 13 not the Lucas categorical test. 14 The Tahoe-
Sierra Court, in articulating the whole parcel doctrine, rejected tem-
poral segmentation and admonished the principle that the denomina-
tor in regulatory takings cases should consist of the whole parcel. 15 
To the extent the First English decision left a door open for 
temporary, prospective closures of private property pursuant to state 
nuisance abatement statutes to constitute Lucas categorical takings, 
the Court's later decision in Tahoe-Sierra closed it. 16 Together, these 
cases provide an incredibly narrow opening for Lucas takings in this 
context - one might say, virtually no opening at all. 
To prove the point, I looked at 1,600 reported regulatory tak-
ings cases decided since the 1992 Lucas decision. 17 I found only four 
6 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
7 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
8 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
9 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011-
12. 
10 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32, 342. 
11 Id. at 331. 
12 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
13 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331. 
14 Id. at 331-32, 342. 
15 Id. at 332. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 Id. These 1,600 cases represent all cases available in the two major online databases 
(Lexis and Westlaw) that cited Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. A total of 1,585 cases were drawn 
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cases in which the property owner succeeded in proving that a Lucas 
categorical taking resulted from the application of a state nuisance 
abatement statute against the property owner's private property. 18 In 
this article, I look at those four cases, examine why the property 
owners succeeded in mounting their Lucas challenges, and discuss 
lessons learned when Lucas, First English, and Tahoe-Sierra are con-
sidered together. 19 
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the many 
Lucas opinions, explaining why the doctrine is so murky and laying 
the groundwork for the dispute over the nuisance abatement statutes 
in the four statutory nuisance cases. Part II examines the four suc-
cessful applications of the Lucas categorical takings rule that were 
triggered by application of state nuisance abatement statutes, pursu-
ant to which, private property owners were temporarily denied all use 
of their property. Part III draws lessons learned from the observa-
tions in Parts I and IL I ultimately conclude that these statutory nui-
sance abatement cases hold little potential for enhancing private 
property rights protections because they ignore, even subvert, the 
whole parcel rule and the temporary takings decisions by the United 
Supreme Court and federal courts since these nuisance abatement 
cases were decided. 20 
I. THE MANY LUCAS OPINIONS 
In 1986, David Lucas, a South Carolina real estate developer, 
purchased two lots in a residential subdivision located in South Caro-
lina on the Isle of Palms.21 He intended to construct single-family 
homes on the lots; however, his plans were interrupted when, in 
1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Man-
agement Act ("the Act"), which prohibited Mr. Lucas from placing 
any "permanent habitable structures" on the lots. 22 At that time, the 
from a Lexis Shepard's Report, and 1,607 cases were drawn from a Westlaw Keycite report. 
The majority of the cases appeared on both reports. 
18 Keshbro, lnc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001); City of St. Petersburg v. 
Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 
1998); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07. 
22 Id. at 1007. 
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Act did not allow for any exceptions.23 Mr. Lucas filed a complaint 
and alleged that the Act's prohibition was a permanent taking of his 
private property, entitling him to just compensation.24 The South 
Carolina state trial court agreed and ruled that the Act's prohibition 
on construction of any permanent structure left the lots "valueless" 
and therefore constituted a total permanent taking of his property.25 
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court. 26 Im-
portant to the South Carolina Supreme Court was Mr. Lucas's con-
cession that the Act was valid and proper in its design to preserve the 
beaches in South Carolina, a public resource. 27 The South Carolina 
Supreme Court ruled that when the State regulates to prevent uses of 
property that will result in serious harm to the public, the State has no 
duty to pay compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, regardless of the se-
verity of the effect of the regulation on the value of the private prop-
erty. 2s 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consid-
er the South Carolina Supreme Court ruling. In a 6-2 opinion, the 
United States Supreme Court relied upon the South Carolina trial 
court's determination that Mr. Lucas's lots had been rendered value-
less and reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. 29 
Once in the United States Supreme Court, the Lucas majority 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, can be conceptualized as no fewer 
than three separate rulings. The first ruling is the categorical regula-
23 Id. at 1009. After Mr. Lucas argued his case before the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
the Act was amended to allow a special permit process. Id. at 10 l 0-11. The United States 
Supreme Court said that because the South Carolina Supreme Court had earlier decided Mr. 
Lucas's unconditional and permanent takings case on the merits, Mr. Lucas's permanent tak-
ings claim, related to his past deprivation of use was ripe for review by the United States Su-
preme Court. Id. at 1011-12. The subsequently enacted special permit process would be 
relevant to any future permit applications, denials, and takings challenges. Lucas, 505 U.S. 
at 1011. 
24 Id. at 1009. 
2s Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1009-10. 
28 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010. 
29 Id. at 1020, 1030, 1032. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion of the Court in which 
Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Thomas joined. Id. at 1005. Justice Kennedy 
wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing), 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a separate statement. Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1076 (statement of Souter, J.). 
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tory takings test. The second ruling is the denominator issue and the 
whole parcel rule. The third ruling is the "exception" to the categori-
cal rule-the nuisance and background principles defense. Calling 
them separate rulings is something of a misnomer as it is exceedingly 
difficult, perhaps impossible even, to discuss either one without also 
discussing the others. 
The defining components of Justice Scalia's majority opinion 
have been the source of considerable judicial and scholarly commen-
tary over the years. The majority opinion elicited a separate concur-
rence by Justice Kennedy, separate dissenting opinions by Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens, and a separate statement by Justice Souter.30 
Reflecting on Lucas as one of the seminal takings cases, regardless of 
one's opinion of the result, it is obvious that these Justices' responses 
to the majority opinion are compelling and insightful. 
A. The Categorical Rule 
The Lucas Court articulated a categorical regulatory takings 
test: private property owners were entitled to compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when a government "regulation 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use ofland."31 What 
might have initially appeared to be a straightforward rule subsequent-
ly elicited debate about whether the Lucas categorical rule turned on 
denial of all value or denial of all use.32 In other words, if a regula-
tion eliminated all use but left a property owner with non-speculative 
or even speculative value, would the Lucas analysis apply or would 
the Penn Central balancing test apply?33 Courts and other legal au-
thorities differ on this point. Some contend that the Court's opinion 
in Tahoe-Sierra endorses loss of value as the Lucas rule. 34 "Any-
thing less than a 'complete elimination of value,' or a 'total loss,' ... 
would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central."35 
30 Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 1076 (statement of 
Souter, J.). 
31 Id. at 1015-16 (majority opinion). 
32 See infra Part III. 
33 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 13, 28 n.99 (2007) 
(discussing the Lucas decision in the context of economic value and citing to the Tahoe-
Sierra decision and others as interpreting the Lucas decision in the total diminution of all 
value context). 
35 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. See also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 
539 (2005) (stating that "[i]n the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a 
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But, other courts and scholars have argued in favor of the loss 
of use construction of the Lucas categorical takings rule. 36 An under-
standing of the Lucas categorical takings rule as only applying when 
a government regulation deprives an owner of all value would signif-
icantly heighten the already substantial impediments to property 
owners' ability to mount successful Lucas challenges. It is difficult 
to imagine a situation in which a speculator could not be found who 
would pay some de minimis amount for a property even if the proper-
ty had been completely deprived of all development rights and even 
temporarily deprived of all rights of use. 37 The law is dynamic, and 
this dynamism, with the potential for favorable future regulatory 
property's value is the determinative factor."); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 
922, 935 (Tex. 1998) ("A restriction denies the landowner all economically viable use of the 
property or totally destroys the value of the property if the restriction renders the property 
valueless. Determining whether all economically viable use of a property has been denied 
entails a relatively simple analysis of whether value remains in the property after the gov-
ernmental action.") (citations omitted); Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Tak-
ings: Settled Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 483 (2010) 
(stating that Penn Central is the proper approach for moratoria because Lucas applies only 
"when a regulation entirely eliminates a property's value."). 
36 See, e.g., Res. Inv., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 493 (2009) (stating that 
"there appears to be no genuine issue of material fact that Corps' denial of plaintiffs' 404 
permit application left plaintiffs without economically viable use of the project site. Thus, 
plaintiffs' claim falls under Lucas rather than Tahoe-Sierra and Penn Central, and the 
Corps' denial of the 404 permit may very well have left plaintiffs without economically via-
ble use of their property.) (emphasis added); Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 231 
F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (appearing to analogize the concepts). 
Id. 
A "categorical" talcing is, by accepted convention, one in which all eco-
nomically viable use, i.e., all economic value, has been taken by the reg-
ulatory imposition. Such a taking is distinct from a taking that is the 
consequence of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts only 
some of the uses that would otherwise be available to the property own-
er, but leaves the owner with substantial viable economic use. 
The Lucas Court indicated two factors that are relevant to determining 
whether property has an economically viable use. The first is the re-
maining market value of the land. If a regulation renders property "val-
ueless", then no economically viable use remains . . . . The second fac-
tor is the remaining uses available to the landowner. The Court gave 
little specific guidance for the application of this factor, but did indicate 
that a regulation that requires land to be left substantially in its natural 
state deprives the owner of economically viable use. 
Ann T. Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Reg-
ulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REv. 415, 427 (1993) (citations omitted). 
37 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Lucas may put his land 
to 'other uses'-fishing or camping, for example-or may sell his land to his neighbors as a 
buffer. In either event, his land is far from 'valueless.' "). 
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change for a property owner, creates speculative value at the right 
price point. And, if Lucas is understood as only applying when there 
is no value, then it truly is difficult to make the case of a Lucas total 
taking. An exception to the proposition articulated above would be 
instances in which the lack of development potential combines with 
other negative factors such as environmental remediation costs, hold-
ing costs, demolition costs, and property tax liability to create "nega-
tive value."38 
B. The Denominator and Whole Parcel Doctrine 
Essential to the total takings claim is an analysis of the de-
nominator issue and the whole parcel doctrine. What is the relevant 
private property interest against which the regulatory impact will be 
measured?39 The Lucas opinion lacks objective guidance for deter-
mining the relevant parcel to constitute the denominator.40 The Court 
acknowledges that the denominator calculation raises a "difficult 
question" and recognizes it has "produced inconsistent pronounce-
ments" as a consequence of "uncertainty regarding the composition 
of the denominator."41 The Lucas majority opinion does not raise the 
denominator issue as a central concern because the Court was con-
strained to accept the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas' de-
termination that the South Carolina regulation rendered Mr. Lucas's 
lot valueless.42 Justice Scalia addresses it in dictum, as does Justice 
Blackmun in his dissent.43 
Justice Stevens emphasizes the "unsoundness" of the majority 
opinion in light of the elasticity of the concept of private property 
rights and the proclivity of owners to manipulate the nature of their 
property interest, the denominator, post-Lucas, to improve the odds 
of a Lucas takings challenge.44 He explains: 
38 City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 44-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). 
39 Lost Tree Vil!. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (portend-
ing to challenge Penn Central as a seminal decision on the point of the relevant denomina-
tor). 
40 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n. 7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force ofour 'deprivation of all 
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make 
clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured."). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1016 n.7 (majority opinion). 
43 Id. at 1016 n.7; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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[D]evelopers and investors may market specialized es-
tates to take advantage of the Court's new rule. The 
smaller the estate, the more likely that a regulatory 
change will effect a total taking. Thus, an investor 
may, for example, purchase the right to build a multi-
family home on a specific lot, with the result that a 
zoning regulation that allows only single-family 
homes would render the investor's property interest 
"valueless." In short, the categorical rule will likely 
have one of two effects: Either courts will alter the 
definition of the "denominator" in the takings "frac-
tion," rendering the Court's categorical rule meaning-
less, or investors will manipulate the relevant property 
interests, giving the Court's rule sweeping effect. 45 
357 
Stevens concludes this portion of his dissent by challenging the ma-
jority's three rationales for the categorical rule: that total deprivations 
are analogous to physical takings, that the rule will be rarely applied 
and therefore will not significantly impact the workings of govern-
ment, and the risk of undue '"singling out"' of property owners when 
regulation leaves these owners with no economically beneficial use 
of their lands. 46 
In fact, a significant number of the successful Lucas cases are 
thematically linked by private agreements that the courts found suffi-
ciently reduced the denominator factor so as to trigger a taking. 
Whether the impacts of these private agreements reflect intentional 
manipulations or unintended consequences is uncertain. What is 
clear is that the denominator matters and courts have been willing to 
honor private property owners' purposeful restrictions on their prop-
erty interests when ascertaining the denominator for Lucas takings 
purposes. 
Most recently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Lost 
Tree Village Corp. v. United States47 acknowledged the relevant par-
cel as a critically antecedent determination in the takings analysis.48 
Lost Tree, a Florida property owner and land developer, sought a 
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers to fill wet-
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1066-67. 
47 707 F.3d 1286. 
48 Id. at 1292. 
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lands on a 4.99-acre parcel ("Plat 57").49 It obtained all applicable 
state and local approvals, but the Corps denied Lost Tree's wetland 
fill permit application because it said alternatives were available to 
Lost Tree that were "less environmentally damaging."50 Lost Tree 
claimed the denial was a taking of its property. 51 The government 
disagreed and argued that the relevant parcel for the takings analysis 
was the entire John's Island Community, which consisted of approx-
imately 1,300 acres and which had been developed by Lost Tree 
years earlier. 52 Lost Tree argued that the relevant parcel was solely 
Plat 57.53 
The court determined that the relevant parcel was Plat 57 
alone and that Lost Tree's other holdings in the vicinity of Plat 57 
could not be aggregated because Lost Tree had established "distinct 
economic expectations" for its scattered holdings. 54 The court articu-
lated the following guidelines for establishing the denominator com-
position based on its interpretation of relevant Supreme Court and 
other federal precedent. A court's focus should be on "'the parcel as 
a whole"' doctrine and the doctrine should not be extended to include 
the property owner's disparate properties that are situated in the vi-
cinity of the property subject to regulation. 55 Courts should consider 
the economic expectations of property owners who own several par-
cels. If such property owners "'treat[] several legally distinct parcels 
as a single economic unit, together they may constitute the relevant 
parcel'" for the takings analysis.56 But, the relevant parcel may be a 
subset of a larger purchase of land, even contiguous land, when the 
property owner treats the parcels as "distinct economic units" and de-
velops them at different times. 57 
Of course, the parcel as a whole doctrine predates the Lucas 
and Lost Tree decisions and can be traced, most famously, back to the 
landmark United States Supreme Court regulatory takings case of 
49 Id. at 1288-90. 
50 Id. at 1291. 
51 Id. at 1291. 
52 Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1288, 1291. Lost Tree developed the John's Island community 
beginning in 1969 through the mid-1990s. Id. at 1288. 
53 Id. at 1291. 
54 Id. at 1294. 
55 Id. at 1292-93. 
56 Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1293. 
51 Id. 
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Penn Central. 58 The Penn Central Court articulated a three-part reg-
ulatory takings test against which most takings cases are judged. 59 
The Penn Central Court pronounced that when applying the three-
part test and judging the extent and nature of the government's inter-
ference with a property owner's rights, the Court will focus on the 
nature of the regulation's interference with the owner's rights in the 
whole parcel on the grounds that "'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not 
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine 
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogat-
ed."60 A few years later in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. 
DeBenedictis,61 the Court reiterated its commitment to the parcel as a 
whole when constituting the denominator and determining whether a 
regulation worked a taking of private property for Fifth Amendment 
purposes. 62 
C. The Nuisance and Background Principles Defense 
The Lucas Court held that the categorical taking rule was sub-
ject to what has become well-known as the nuisance exception.63 
When a regulation implicates the Lucas categorical taking rule, the 
government can avoid the duty to pay compensation if it can prove 
that the "proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner's] title 
to begin with."64 Effectively, the government must demonstrate that 
the regulation's results could have been achieved judicially under the 
State's "background principles of nuisance and property law."65 
The Lucas Court also rejected the harm prevention and bene-
fit conferring logic as a basis for distinguishing constitutional takings 
by regulation that require compensation from regulatory deprivations 
58 438 U.S. 104. 
59 Id. at 124. In deciding whether a government action amounts to a regulatory takings, 
courts will consider three factors: (l) "the extent to which the regulation" interferes with the 
property owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations;" (2) the character of the regula-
tory action, whether its characteristics are similar to government physical invasions; and (3) 
the regulation's economic impact on the property owner. Id. 
60 Id. at 130. 
61 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
62 Id. at 497. 
63 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067-68. 
64 Id. at 1027. 
65 Id. at 1031. See McQueen v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) 
(relying on the background principles of state property law to reach its holding). 
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that do not require compensation. 66 In so doing, the Court expressly 
rejected the rationale of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 67 The 
South Carolina Supreme Court held that when the regulation is "de-
signed 'to prevent serious public harm,"' property owners are not en-
titled to compensation "under the Takings Clause regardless of the 
regulation's effect on the property's value."68 The South Carolina 
Supreme Court accepted the state legislature's determination that new 
construction on Mr. Lucas's lot would threaten an important public 
resource of the State.69 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court 
unequivocally stated that a legislature's noxious use decree could not 
undermine the categorical rule that compensation must be paid when 
regulations result in total takings. 70 To hold otherwise would com-
promise the limitations the Court had earlier placed on exercises of 
the police power without compensation. 71 
One reading of the majority opinion of the United States Su-
preme Court is that by background principles of nuisance, the Court 
meant background principles of common law nuisance. The Court 
emphasized that on remand: 
[T]o win its case South Carolina must do more than 
proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas 
desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the 
conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law 
maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas .. .. 
[A] "State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private 
property into public property without compensation .. 
. . " Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought 
to restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public 
nuisance, South Carolina must identify background 
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit 
the uses he now intends in circumstances in which the 
property is presently found. Only on this showing can 
the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such bene-
ficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking 
66 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1010. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1026. 
71 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 
(1922)). 
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nothing.72 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion addresses this reading of the 
majority opinion. Justice Kennedy opines that in determining which 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations the Constitution will pro-
tect through the Takings Clause, our entire legal tradition must neces-
sarily be considered. 73 "The common law of nuisance is too narrow a 
confine for the exercise of regulatory power" and the states "should 
not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives" that re-
spond to our interdependent, complex and changing society. 74 More-
over, he criticizes the Supreme Court of South Carolina for citing 
general purposes supporting the enactment of the Beachfront Man-
agement Act without also making findings that the regulation was 
consistent with the property owner's reasonable expectations of use.75 
Justices Stevens and Blackmun criticize the majority's nui-
sance exception as elevating common law nuisance over statutory 
nuisance.76 The majority states that any regulation that denies all 
economically beneficial use of the regulated property "cannot be 
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation)."77 Such a regu-
lation "must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that 
could have been achieved in the courts ... under the State's law of 
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to 
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise."78 Jus-
tice Stevens writes that the Court's decision "effectively freezes the 
State's common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional 
power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."79 
And, Justice Blackmun rejects any common law limitation on the 
State's authority to regulate, without compensation, under the nui-
sance doctrine. 80 He argues that common law courts frequently re-
jected such a limited understanding of the State's power and that the 
72 Id. at 1031-32; see also Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 631 (demonstrating one of the successful 
Lucas nuisance abatement cases discussed in Part II, stating the Lucas nuisance exception 
was limited to common law nuisances). 
73 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
74 Id. at 1035. 
1s Id. 
76 Id. at 1053-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
77 Lucas, 505 U.S at 1029 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 1059-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Takings Clause imposes no such limitation. 81 He rejects the majori-
ty's narrowing of the nuisance doctrine in takings jurisprudence and 
instead relies upon precedent that recognizes the authority "for the 
legislature to interpose, and by positive enactment to prohibit a use of 
property which would be injurious to the public."82 
Justice Souter anticipated these nuisance abatement type cases 
in his Lucas statement. He wrote that the Court's opinion assumes 
cases may arise in which nuisance abatement under state law could 
deny all economically beneficial use of land. 83 He was skeptical of 
the Court's accuracy, stating: 
The nature of nuisance law ... indicates that applica-
tion of a regulation defensible on grounds of nuisance 
prevention or abatement will quite probably not 
amount to a complete deprivation in fact. The nui-
sance enquiry focuses on conduct, not on the character 
of the property on which that conduct is performed, 
and the remedies for such conduct usually leave the 
property owner with other reasonable uses of his prop-
erty. Indeed it is difficult to imagine property that can 
be used only to create a nuisance, such that its sole 
economic value must presuppose the right to occupy it 
for such seriously noxious activity. 84 
II. APPLYING THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION-FOUR SUCCESSFUL 
LUCAS TAKINGS CHALLENGES 
Many private property rights advocates lauded the results of 
the Lucas decision and hoped that the case would infuse land use 
control with greater private property rights protections. 85 In contrast, 
81 Id. 
82 Lucas, 505 U.S at 1059 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tewsbury, 52 Mass. 55, 57 (I 
Cush. 1846). 
83 Id. at 1077 (statement of Souter, J.). 
84 Id. at 1077-78 (citations omitted). 
85 See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas 's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise 
of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 321 
(2005). See also Nancie G. Marzulla, A Two-Front Battle for Property Rights, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 18, 1992), http://www.csmonitor.com/l 992/0918/l 8 l 91 
.html/(page )/2 ("There is little in the Lucas opinion for opponents of private-property rights 
to be happy about."); Tom Kenworthy & Kirstin Downey, South Carolina May Have to Pay 
Compensation in Property Case, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 
5574135. 
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some environmentalists and Supreme Court "watchers" doubted the 
case's promise for real impact. 86 Even as the Court announced the 
categorical takings test, it predicted that the Lucas decision would 
apply in "relatively rare situations"87 and only under the most "ex-
traordinary circumstance[s]."88 The following statutory nuisance 
abatement cases represent one quarter of one percent of all the cases 
in which property owners succeeded in making the Lucas challenge. 
First, in City of Seattle v. McCoy89 the City brought a proceed-
ing to abate the McCoys' operation of their lounge and restaurant 
(Oscar's II) under a drug nuisance statute. 90 The McCoys' property 
interest was a leasehold on the property on which Oscar's II was lo-
cated.91 Oscar's II was found to be a drug nuisance by the trial court 
and it was ordered closed for one year.92 The trial court's order re-
sulted in Oscar's II being place in the court's custody pursuant to an 
applicable statutory provision.93 On appeal, the court found that ap-
plication of the nuisance statute to the McCoys was a temporary tak-
ing.94 The court articulated the nuisance exception as "whether the 
common law of nuisance would have allowed abatement of the law-
ful business activity against an innocent owner for the illegal drug ac-
tivities of unidentified business patrons which, when the activities 
occurred, were unknown and may not have been observable."95 The 
court determined that the McCoys were innocent owners, that they 
acted reasonably to attempt to abate the nuisance, and that the com-
86 See generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme 
Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Mat-
ter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523 (1995) (reviewing state court cases relying on the Lucas 
decision and stating that the vast majority do not find regulatory takings); see Lazarus, supra 
note 34, at 23 (stating that the Lucas "opinion was virtually 'dead on arrival' in terms of its 
potential to establish significant precedent favorable to the property rights movement."); but 
see Victoria Sutton, Constitutional Taking Doctrine -Did Lucas Really Make a Difference?, 
18 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 505, 516-17 (2001) (discussing Lucas's narrow direct application 
but its "profound indirect impacts"). 
87 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. 
88 Id. at 1017. 
89 4 P.3d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
90 Id. at 161. 
91 Id. at 162. 
92 Id. at 161. 
93 Id. 
94 McCoy, 4 P.3d at 166-67 ("By virtue of the abatement order ... the building [is] in the 
custody of the court. Therefore, the McCoys are not in possession. They cannot put the 
property to any economically viable use pending the expiration of one year .... "). 
95 Id. at 167. 
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mon law nuisance exception in that state was based upon whether the 
owners, given their constructive and actual knowledge, took reasona-
ble steps to abate the nuisance.96 The court held that the City did not 
meet its burden of proving a common law nuisance according to the 
Lucas exception. 97 
McCoy was the only nuisance exception case in which the 
owner restricted the denominator by acquiring only a leasehold inter-
est. 98 The First English dissent likely imagined this type of case 
when describing the qualities of temporary Lucas takings.99 A lease-
hold of sufficiently short remaining duration and a sufficiently 
lengthy nuisance abatement closure when combined with other fac-
tors such as insufficient tailoring and acquiescence or participation by 
the owner in the nuisance activity might be sufficient to overcome the 
First English dissent and the Tahoe-Sierra Court's caution against 
temporal segmentation in the application of the Lucas categorical rule 
and its nuisance exception. 100 
Second, City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen 101 involved applica-
tion of a nuisance abatement statute to the property owner's fifteen-
unit apartment complex. 102 Mr. Bowen owned a fee simple in the 
apartment complex which was ordered closed for one year after being 
found to constitute a statutory nuisance because of purported drug use 
by tenants of the apartment complex and others who were on the 
property. 103 The court found a temporary Lucas taking because the 
building could not be put to any economic use during the one-year 
closure period. 104 The court stated that the Lucas exception limited 
the matter to common law nuisances and that no common law nui-
sance doctrine prohibited using a building for rental purposes. 105 
96 Id. at 171. 
97 Id. at 171-72. 
98 See supra Part II. 
99 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(discussing regulations that "remain in effect for a significant percentage of the property's 
useful life."). 
100 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 (finding that Penn Central and not Lucas was the ap-
propriate takings test to apply after considering the temporary nature of the regulation and 
the "average holding time" of the property in question). 
101 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
102 Id at 629. 
103 Id. at 627-28. 
104 Id. at 629; see supra Part I-A (discussing the value versus use interpretations of the 
Lucas opinion). 
105 Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 631. 
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Third, Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami106 consolidated two cas-
es, City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger107 and City of Miami v. 
Keshbro 108 ("the Stardust Motel"). The property interest held by the 
owners was a fee simple absolute in an apartment complex and in a 
motel, respectively. In both cases, the court found that the closure 
orders deprived the owners of all economically beneficial use of their 
property. 109 The issue for the court and the reason for the different 
ultimate results was the question of specific tailoring of the closure 
orders to "abate the objectionable conduct, without unnecessarily in-
fringing upon the conduct of a lawful enterprise." 110 
The court found that the regulation in Kablinger was a Lucas 
categorical taking and that the Lucas nuisance exception did not ap-
ply.111 But, in Keshbro, the court said the nuisance exception did ap-
ply and was a defense to the property owner's claim of a Lucas cate-
gorical taking. 112 The six-month temporary closing of the apartment 
in Kablinger, according to the court, was not attended by the same 
extensive record indicating that the nuisance (drug activity) had be-
come inextricable from the operation of the Stardust Motel in 
Keshbro. 113 Absent such a record, the court found the closure order 
for one year in Kablinger was not sufficiently tailored to benefit from 
the Lucas nuisance exception. 114 In contrast, the court found that the 
drug and prostitution activity at the Stardust Motel in Keshbro had 
become "part and parcel" of the Stardust's operation and that the City 
of Miami had failed to eradicate this nuisance activity despite patient 
attempts. 115 
Finally, the Ohio case of State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah116 in-
volved three consolidated cases in which the property interest was a 
fee simple absolute in residential property. 117 In all three cases, it 
was alleged that non-owner residents, while occupying three different 
106 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001). 
107 730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
108 717 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001). 
109 Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 868-70. 
110 Id. at 876. 
111 Id. at 876-77. 
112 Id. at 876. 
113 Id. at 876-77. 
114 Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 877. 
115 Id. at 876. 
116 702 N.E.2d 81(Ohio1998). 
117 Id. at 83, 85. 
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residential properties, committed drug-related felonies. 118 Each prop-
erty owner was found to have taken affirmative, good faith action to 
investigate and remove offending residents. 119 The court found that 
application of the nuisance abatement statute was a taking as it re-
quired, upon the finding of a nuisance, the issuance of a temporary, 
one-year closure order forbidding use of the property for any pur-
pose.120 Additionally, the court held that in each of the three cases, 
the closings, under the facts, would be unconstitutional forfeitures 
and seizures of property in violation of the federal Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 121 
The court distinguished these cases from Bennis v. Michigan 122 in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that forfeiture of proper-
ty, even as applied to good-faith property owners, was not a Fifth 
Amendment Taking requiring the government to pay compensation 
because such property is acquired, not by the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain, but through forfeiture. 123 
The court distinguished Bennis from the facts of this case in 
four ways. First, the court said the plaintiff in Bennis conceded that 
her property was subject to civil forfeiture and only argued the issue 
of compensation; therefore, the Court was not required to "evaluate 
the propriety of the forfeiture itself."124 Second, it was important to 
the majority in Bennis that the statutory framework allowed judicial 
discretion to determine the propriety of the forfeiture; in contrast, the 
Ohio statutory framework did not allow for a similar exercise of dis-
cretion. 125 Third, unlike the property owners in State ex rel. Pizza, 
the property owner in Bennis did not offer evidence of affirmative ac-
tions that she took to avoid having her property used for an illegal 
purpose nor did she offer evidence of any action that she took to 
118 Id. at 83-86. 
119 Id. at 85-86. 
120 Id. at 88-89. 
Nor is the closure-order provision saved from constitutional infirmity by 
the availability of judicial release through the filing of a bond in the full 
value of the property. Deprivation of the use of resources equal to the 
value of the property is as much a taking as is deprivation of the use of 
the property itself. 
Pizza, N.E.2d at 88. 
121 Id. at 86. 
122 516 U.S. 442 (1996). 
123 Pizza, 702 N.E.2d at 90-91; Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452. 
124 Pizza, 702 N.E.2d at 90. 
125 Id. at 91. 
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abate the use of her property for an illegal purpose. 126 And finally, 
the court noted that the remedial objectives achieved through forfei-
ture in the Bennis case, revenue generation, though concededly mod-
est, would not be achieved by a temporary closure. 127 
Interestingly, the state decisions discussing the Lucas taking 
in the nuisance abatement context all involve statutory nuisances. 
Despite the apprehension about statutory nuisances that can be read 
into the Lucas majority opinion, 128 subsequent courts and scholars 
seem to have accepted that the decision is not limited to common law 
nuisances. 129 However, these cases do not turn on the distinction be-
tween common law and statutory nuisances that Justices Stevens and 
Blackmun emphasize in their dissents. 130 The state courts, in their 
analysis of the merits, tend to emphasize the breadth of the applica-
tion of the nuisance statute (the extent to which non-nuisance activi-
ties are also prohibited) and the bonafides of the property owners. 131 
Additionally, a common theme in the nuisance abatement 
cases is the courts' insistence upon specific tailoring and circum-
spectness in the application of nuisance abatement statutes and tem-
porary closure orders, especially in the context of property owners 
who were not involved in the conduct that was the subject of the stat-
ute. Absent this specific tailoring, the courts have declined to apply 
the nuisance exception. 132 
Finally, the denominator issue and the whole parcel rule were 
not prevalent in these nuisance abatement cases. One reading of these 
decisions is that the state courts essentially determined to abandon the 
whole parcel rule and treat the Lucas decision as a categorical rule of 
compensation upon a total deprivation of all use for a temporary pe-
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See supra Part 1-C. 
129 See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 85, at 334. ("Some lower courts seem to have taken Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence to heart, ruling that 'background principles' nuisances include 
more than just the common law variety."); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" 
on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1426 (1993) (stating that "the majority's intimations that 
the background principles must be supplied by judge-made common law, rather than by leg-
islative or regulatory enactment, will probably not survive review in the future."). 
130 See supra Part 1-C. 
131 See supra Part II. 
132 In the spirit of Justice Souter's observation on this point, in Keshbro, Inc. v. City of 
Miami, the court found in one of the two consolidated cases that the nuisance exception did 
apply because the nuisance activity could not be extricated from the non-nuisance activity 
and therefore, the order of closure was reasonable. See supra notes 77, 79, and accompany-
ing text. 
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riod of time. The next logical step was to temporally segment the 
property, which allowed the temporary abatement of all use pursuant 
to the nuisance abatement statutes to trigger the temporary Lucas tak-
ings that the courts found in most of the cases. 
Ill. LESSONS LEARNED 
Prospectively, these statutory nuisance abatement cases hold 
little traction for enhancing private property rights protections be-
cause they ignore, even subvert, the whole parcel rule and the tempo-
rary takings guidance proffered by the Supreme Court and federal 
courts since these cases were decided. First, all of the statutory nui-
sance cases were decided prior to 2002 when the United States Su-
preme Court decided Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Ta-
hoe Regional Planning Agency. 133 In that case, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the Lucas challenge to development morato-
ria totaling thirty-two months and concluded that the Penn Central134 
regulatory takings balancing test should be applied to the facts in-
stead.135 The Court rejected temporal segmentation and admonished 
that the denominator in regulatory takings cases should consist of the 
whole parcel, stating, "[l]ogically, a fee simple estate cannot be ren-
dered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because 
the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted."136 
The Court concluded that in cases such as the one before it, where 
property owners were faced with prospectively temporary takings, the 
focus should be on the whole parcel, not a temporal slice, and the 
analysis should be under Penn Central and not Lucas. 137 
The significance of the temporary nature of the taking to the 
Tahoe-Sierra Court should not be underplayed. Lucas was a perma-
nent and unconditional takings case under the statute as written at the 
time the case was heard by the South Carolina Supreme Court. 138 In 
contrast, all of the statutory nuisance cases were expressly and pro-
133 The case was decided on April 23, 2002. 535 U.S. 302. The decision in City of Seattle 
v. McCoy, the most recent of the nuisance abatement cases, was filed on April 1, 2002. 48 
P.3d 993 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
134 438 U.S. 104. 
135 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334. 
136 Id. at 332. 
137 Id. at 329, 342. 
138 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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spectively temporary closures and argued as temporary takings. 139 
Post Tahoe-Sierra, these prospectively and expressly temporary regu-
latory takings claims will be difficult to win under the Lucas analysis 
where the property owner owns the property in fee. 
While the federal courts have not foreclosed the possibility of 
temporary categorical takings, the area has been circumscribed. 140 In 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angles, California, the United States Supreme Court held that 
temporary takings are compensable. 141 The Court cited several phys-
ical takings cases as "reflect[ing] the fact that 'temporary' takings 
which ... deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different 
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly 
requires compensation."142 However, the dissent noted that the phys-
ical takings cases were "inapposite" for the proposition that tempo-
rary and permanent takings are indistinguishable and further observed 
that for a temporary restriction to effect a taking, the regulatory re-
striction must be substantial and effective "for a significant percent-
age of the property's useful life."143 
First English Evangelical was, and is, a significant Supreme 
Court decision because of its contribution to establishing the com-
pensability of temporary takings. Though decided more than a dec-
ade before all but one of the four nuisance exception cases, the state 
courts virtually ignored the decision, with the exception of the court 
139 See supra Part II. 
140 Res. Invs. Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at481-82. 
Further contrary to defendant's argument, the Federal Circuit has contin-
ually refased to hold that categorical treatment is inapposite for a tempo-
rary taking, despite numerous opportunities and invitations to do so. In 
the context of a physical invasion, to which the Supreme Court com-
pared the totality of the taking in Lucas, "'permanent' does not mean 
forever, or anything like it. A taking can be for a limited term-what is 
'taken' is, in the language of real property law, an estate for years, that 
is, a term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite term of an estate 
in fee simple absolute." 
Id.; see infra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's articulation of when a 
temporary taking can rise to the level of a categorical taking). 
141 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("In Boise Cascade we explained that the Supreme Court may have 
only 'rejected [the] application of the per se rule articulated in Lucas to temporary develop-
ment moratoria,' and not to temporary takings that result from the rescission of a permit re-
quirement or denial.") (citations omitted). 
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in Keshbro, Inc. v. Miami. 144 The court in Keshbro distinguished 
First English from the nuisance abatement cases, stating that the 
property owners in the nuisance abatement cases were "being de-
prived of a property's dedicated use" unlike in First English, a tem-
porary moratoria case. 145 Thus, the court effectively ignored the 
whole parcel rule and treated prospectively temporary regulations as 
the equivalent of retrospectively temporary regulations for purposes 
of the Lucas takings analysis. 146 
Moreover, to the extent that the Lucas categorical rule only 
applies when there is complete loss of value; temporary elimination 
of use under the statutory foreclosure statutes with retention of future 
use and therefore speculative future value would seem to foreclose 
the Lucas challenge and require the Penn Central kind of analysis. In 
regulatory takings matters, "the parcel as a whole" analysis is the 
federal standard. 147 Thus, with this understanding, there can only be 
a Lucas categorical regulatory taking if the land as a whole parcel is 
deprived of all value or use. 
CONCLUSION 
The structure of the Lucas opinion itself and of subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions places substantial, contemporary, limita-
tions on the viability of the Lucas takings claim in the statutory nui-
sance abatement context. Most of the successful Lucas challenges 
are special circumstances cases in which an intervening act or cir-
cumstance triggers the Lucas taking. The statutory nuisance abate-
ment cases are likely outliers and prospectively hold little potential 
for enhancing private property rights protections in the future. 
144 Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 873-74. 
145 Id. at 874. 
146 Id. at 873-74. 
147 Lost Tree Viii. Corp., 707 F.3d at 1292-93; Seiber, 364 F.3d at 1368. 
